

Cyberattacks

– Technical Aspects and Countermeasures –



Prof. Dr. Ulrich Bühler

Agenda Cyberattacks and Countermeasures

1 Digital Society – always connected

Social Networks, Health Care,
Wearable Techniques, Car Entertainment

2 Current Attacks and Implications

Attack Scenarios, Advanced Persistent Threats,
IT-Espionage

3 Some Countermeasures

Encryption, Authentication, Integrity
Network and Data Security


4 Summary

Proactive IT-Security, Awareness



Digital Society – always connected **NETWORK & DATA SECURITY**

Chips surround us – everywhere !




Smartphones, Tablets, ...

Cloud Computing (Saas, IaaS)


Embedded Systems (RFID etc.)

Social Networks (Facebook, StudiVZ, Google etc.)



Ubiquitous Information and Communication Systems !


(Georg Orwells fictions based on his novel „1984“ published in 1948 are real and daily routine in today's information technologies)

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Digital Society – always connected **NETWORK & DATA SECURITY**


Cloud Computing

Software, Apps and IT-Infrastructures can be leased as a service over the Internet



Hype or Revolution of the Internet ?

Gartner Analysts:
Cloud Computing is a style of Computing in which massively scalable IT related capabilities are provided 'as a service' using Internet technologies to multiple external customers.

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Car Entertainment

ALLES IM GRIFF
DIE BESTE VERBINDUNG ist nicht immer eine Straße. Mit „Mercedes connect me“ bleiben Fahrzeug und Fahrer per Smartphone in Kontakt - egal, wo sie sich gerade befinden.

TÜRFERNSCHLISSUNG
Wenn Sie vergessen haben, das Auto abzuschließen, können Sie es mit dem Smartphone aus der Ferne verriegeln oder öffnen (voraussetzungsabhängig ab Mitte 2015).

FAHRZEUG-STANDORT
Sie haben Ihr Auto in einer fremden Stadt geparkt und wissen nicht mehr, wo? Kein Problem, die Smart-

WARTUNGS-MANAGEMENT
Das System erkennt, wann das Fahrzeug gewartet werden muss, und sendet die notwendigen Daten an die Werkstatt, die ein Angebot erstellt.

EIN BLICK aufs Smartphone genügt, um zu erfahren, wie viel Sprit noch im Tank ist.

FAHRZEUGSTATUS-FERNABFRAGE
Wichtige Informationen wie Tankanzeige, Reichweite u.a. lassen sich bequem per Internet abfragen - vom Computer oder Smartphone aus.

Almost real !

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Wearable Technologies

The NFC ring can unlock your smartphone or tablet when you slide your hand under the device. It can be used to transfer data, pictures, links, and more to your friends' smartphones. It can start apps with custom parameters, and it can even unlock the door to your house, if you install a compatible lock.

Biggest Market: Health Sector

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
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Digital Society – always connected

NETWORK
& DATA SECURITY

Augmented Reality

- Enrichment of real-world environment with digital information over Internet (Outernet)
- Information about the surrounding real world of the mobile user becomes interactive and digitally manipulable



Threats and Risks are ubiquitous in everyday´s life !



Current Attacks and Implications

NETWORK
& DATA SECURITY

Threats, Vulnerabilities, Risks, Attacks, Damages

Vulnerabilities arise e.g. from

- **Bugs** in Software: due to unavoidable complexity
 - **Backdoors:**
Software developers implement tools to connect to a computer from a remote location (remote desktop application, remote network maintenance);
Secret Services install and employ these to gain information
 - **Design weaknesses** of network components, enterprise infrastructure systems, software, services, commercial applications, industrial control systems and so on: often not known publicly, not intended by developer
- and are the cause of a lot of **threats and cyberattacks**
- Infiltration of malware (e.g. Trojans, Phishing, botnets)
 - Activities, which endangers the availability of processes, services and applications (e.g. Stuxnet, Flame)
 - Interruption of IT infrastructure as the medium for communication between users, applications, business processes, ... (e.g. Spam, Botnets)



Current Attacks and Implications

Malicious Software (Malware) Injection

Malware: all kind of code or programs designed to infiltrate and damage IT systems, to harvest sensitive information, to control machines without users approval; is more and more sophisticated with high complexity

Major Different types

- **Worms:** designed to spread without users knowledge (e.g. Slammer, Blaster, Sasser)
- **Trojan Horses (Trojans):** combine a visible and a hidden malicious functionality (e.g. Mydoom, Phatbot), with Rootkits
- **Rootkits:** a masking technique to protect malware for detection by antimalware tools, so-called stealth techniques; have no malicious capability per se (e.g. Uroburos, Mebroot)
- **Spyware, Rootkits, Keylogger:** programs used by miscreants or secret services to steal or gather sensitive information from users, enterprises and governmental authorities or suspicious persons and groups (e.g. Stuxnet, Flame, Regin)



Current Attacks and Implications

Threat landscape and types of attacks has changed dramatically

- **Botnet:** primary means for miscreants to achieve their objectives
 - network of malware-infected hosts (zombies) that are controlled by a miscreant (botmaster)
 - once infected with malware (bot) the botmaster commands the zombies (traffic between the bot and its command and control server, C&C) to attack a victim (installation of Trojans to collect sensitive information and transmits it to the botmaster)
 - Examples: Torbig botnet, Gameover Zeus
- Infection of victims through **‘Drive-by-Download’**
 - Web pages on vulnerable web servers are modified with the inclusion of HTML tags (iframes)
 - tags cause the victims browser to request JavaScript code from a website under control of the attacker (drive-by-download server)
 - the JavaScript code launches exploits against the browser or components (ActiveX controls, plugins)
 - From the drive-by-download server e.g. an executable is downloaded and executed
- Daily thousands of companies are victims of **DDoS-Attacks** by botnets (e.g. Websites are not anymore accessible, e-mail servers are broken down)



Current Attacks and Implications

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Lifecycle

- **Exploitation of vulnerabilities** in Apps, Operation systems, ... to **inject malicious code** executed on victims machine
- **Callback to Command & Control (C&C) Server**
Connection with attacker, waiting for further commands
- **Malware Download**
Download of proper malware depending on the objectives
- **Data Exfiltration**
Data harvesting, cover the tracks
- **Lateral Spread**
further activities on victims machine



A Lot of different types of attacks are following this procedure !



Current Attacks and Implications

Example: APT Rootkit 'Urobuos'

- Rootkit with espionage functionality (Source: Die Welt Kompakt, 10. 03 2014)
- affected are MS Windows systems
- consists of several modules 'invisible' stored, highly complex (Ralf Benzmüller, Fa. G-Data)
- named after Egyptian symbol of the snake bites into its own tail
- First infection with Malware to overtake the victim machine (exploitation of vulnerabilities)
- Callback to Command & Control (C&C) Server: Download of proper malware depending on the objectives of attackers (e.g. shutdown anti-malware tools, look for other connections, infection of other computers in the network, setting a *Peer2Peer-Net (P2P)* with other machines not connected with Internet to harvest sensitive data) all requests and responses are encrypted
- Data Exfiltration: installation of special encrypted file systems on the hard disc of victim, harvesting of data in the P2P net
- Origin: in most cases it remains unclear, but probably Russia because with malware 'Agent.BTZ' infected machines are not attacked furthermore (Pentagon was attacked with Agent.BTZ, exposed in 2008) and Urobuos has similar structures



Current Attacks and Implications

Example: Ransomware

- Type of trojan horse that blocks user's computer and encrypt all data on hard disk
- Message on Screen, like
... due to illegal user activities the computer has been blocked on behalf of regulating authority; after online paying monetary penalty the access will be granted
- In most cases decryption without key is not possible
- Distribution with Botnets and Spam
- In most cases victims are paying penalty



Current Attacks and Implications

Example: Bad USB (Source: heise security 31.07.2014)

- Firmware Manipulation of USB-Storage-Sticks: Communication (data transfer) between PC and Stick is carried out with SCSI protocol, that has no protective mechanisms and so can be reprogrammed with malware
- Malware infect victim system and enables infection of other connected sticks
- impact: e.g. deletion of data and files, modification of settings



Example: Backoff Point-of-Sale Malware (PoS) (Source: US-Cert Alert TA14-212A, 2014)

- Remote Desktop Applications permit connectivity to a computer from a remote location
- Attacker finds out access rights and installs PoS malware to manipulate online paying systems
- Attacker collects customers data (e.g. names, mailing addresses, credit/debit card numbers, phone numbers)
- Misuse of data, e.g. shopping with customers identity, purchasing personal data at great scale in the underground
- *APT functionality*: small malicious code (called stub) in explorer.exe that protects deletion, scans storage, has keylogging functionality and is able to reload further malware from C&C server

Current Attacks and Implications



Cybercrime underground: Commoditization of Malware Distribution

Pay-Per-Install (PPI) Market:

- Value-chain from creation and distribution of malware to infect victim computers
- Provides a means for miscreants to outsource the global dissemination of their malware
- Consists of three main actors: clients (miscreants), PPI providers (services), affiliates (third parties)
- Typical PPI transactions: the service conducts downloader infections itself or via affiliates on victim computers; installation of client programs onto the target hosts (victims)



Perfect Infrastructure for Cybercrime: PPI marketplaces

Current Attacks and Implications



NSA Locations in Germany

- Task of the National Security Agency: *Interception and decoding of all kinds of foreign communication, which might be of interest for US security*
- Tools disclose all interrelation in connection with data




Source: Der Spiegel 25/2014

In principle: from abstract syntax to semantic
Metadata – Information – Intelligence

Current Attacks and Implications

It began many years ago ...



Ware, W.: *Security Controls for Computer Systems*: Report of Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security – RAND Report R-609-1. Santa Monica 1967

Current Attacks and Implications

NSA Attacks (Edward Snowden's disclosures)

- Tapped facilities: *Facebook, Google, Yahoo, also Microsoft and Apple !!!*
 - Everybody leaves tracks in Web !
 - Preferences, frequently used websites, movement, ...
- Eavesdrop of E-Mail- and Mobile communication
 - Tapped infrastructure notes, internet service provider
 - Gmail (Google Mail), ...
 - Record communication via Whatsapp, Skype, GoogleTalk
- Analysis of photos (*Flickr* etc.) and videos (*Youtube* etc.)
 - Face recognition
 - Movement profiles (GPS data)
- Attacks on encrypted communication
 - "Cracking" weak Encryption algorithms
 - "Place" backdoors into tools of widespread encryption algorithms
 - Data harvesting before encryption
 - Chip "Sabotage"
- Collaboration with other secret services (e.g. Data exchange to avoid legal conflicts)



"HE TOLD ME IT WAS ALL PERFECTLY LEGAL!"

Current Attacks and Implications

Example: NSA Tool XKeyscore

XKEYSCORE
25 Feb 2008
xkeyscore@nsa

What XKS does with the Sessions

Plug-ins extract and index metadata into tables

Flow: [sessions] → [processing engine] → (database) ← (user queries)

Session → phone numbers, email addresses, log ins, user activity → metadata tables (full log)

Current Attacks and Implications

What does Xkeyscore render ?

Finding Targets

- How do I find a strong-selector for a known target?
- How do I find a cell of terrorists that has no connection to known strong-selectors?
- Answer: Look for anomalous events
 - E.g. Someone whose language is out of place for region they are in
 - Someone who is using encryption
 - Someone searching the web for suspicious stuff

Technology Detection

- Show me all the VPN startups in country X, and give me the data so I can decrypt and discover the users
- These events are easily browsable in XKEYSCORE
 - No strong-selector

Language Tracking

- My target speaks German but is in Pakistan – how can I find him?
- XKEYSCORE's HTTP Activity plugin extracts and stores all HTML language tags which can then be searched
- Not possible in any other system but XKEYSCORE, nor could it be –
 - volumes are too great to forward
 - No strong-selector

Current Attacks and Implications

Open Source – not secure too ?

■ **Open SSL Heartbleed Bug** (CVE-2014-0160): Vulnerability into *TLS/DTLS-Heartbeat-Extension*

- TLS-Heartbeat function enables the maintenance of connectivity between server and client
- The bug leads to the leak of memory content from server to the client and vice versa
- Reason: security protocol doesn't verify payload size and content
- More than 16 KByte server storage content will be sent (e.g. secret keys used to identify the service providers and to encrypt the traffic, user passwords)
- It is no design flaw, it is a programming mistake in popular OpenSSL library



Some Countermeasures


Security Objectives




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Some Countermeasures

Security Objectives Features/services that IT-Systems have to fulfil to prevent threats

<p>Confidentiality, Privacy (protects all data transmitted or stored; third party can not understand the content)</p>	➔	<p>Encryption</p>	
<p>Integrity (data received or stored are exactly as sent or stored previously, contain no modification)</p>	➔	<p>Checksum, Hashfunction</p>	
<p>Authentication (Data-Origin, User) (creator of a message is the one that it claims to be, source of data is authentic)</p>	➔	<p>Digital Signature, Identification</p>	
<p>Availability (avoids denial of service)</p>	➔	<p>Redundancy , Backup, IDS</p>	
<p>Nonrepudiation (provides protection against denial by one of the communication entities)</p>	➔	<p>Digitale Signatur, PKI, Certificates</p>	
<p>Access Control (only identified and authorized entities may use of a resource)</p>	➔	<p>Authentication techniques</p>	

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Some Countermeasures

(A) Technical: LAN-Security Gateway

Central Firewall-System with extended Security functionalities

- Additional security features (*Security Appliance*) are
 - Anti-Malware-Scanner and Content Filter
 - Spam-Filter
 - E-Mail-Filter with protected areas (Sandbox)
 - Incident Management with IDS/IPS
- Mobile Security aspects
 - Use of mobile devices (Notebook, tablets) in enterprises after security check in screened areas (Patchlevel of operating system, Anti-Malware-Scanner, Spam-Filter etc.), if necessary implementation of up-to-date versions
 - Sandbox to check malware activities, ...
- Strict access control: use of proven and tested authentication protocols to prevent identity theft
- Encrypted communication with non-manipulated algorithms
- Data integrity check, prevent data leakage
- ... and others



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Some Countermeasures

(B) Political: Formalities, Laws

- Enforcement of technological Sovereignty
National/European developed IT Security technologies (if possible ?)
- Producer and Service Provider Liability of security flaws of products and services
- Reward searching of vulnerabilities, offer incentives
- Incentives for quality measures of IT products
- Save-Harbor EuGH court decision
- ... and others

(C) Organisational: Riskmanagement & Functional Testing

- Security policy: *Attackers are inside !*
Risk- and emergency management, remaining risk acceptance
- Social Engineering
- Design of secure and solid systems from beginning
Approach: holistic Security Testing Process, Functional Testing

Security by Design – Code Analysis – Penetration Testing – Fuzzing





Cyber Crime?
“The probability of a major cyber attack is not ‘if’ but ‘when’.
Oliver Crispin-Laband, Global Information Highway, United Kingdom



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Summary


IT-Security

To my Conclusions

1. Digitalization of Society cannot be stopped (Pervasive Computing)
2. Right to Privacy in IT Systems primarily neglected due to missing or insufficient legal positions; must be integrant of EU's digital agenda
3. Today's Crime is cybercrime: any criminal act has a digital equivalent in the internet
4. Intelligence Services monitor not only the internet but satellite communication: data is captured and analyzed at large-scale (principle: data – information – intelligence)
5. Software Vulnerabilities are definitely found by miscreants and heavily exploited in a opportunistic fashion; are kept confidential in the cybercrime scene as long as possible (zero-day-vulnerabilities, Less-than-zero-day-vulnerabilities)
6. Use State-of-the-Art Security Mechanisms to complicate intrusions for attacking instances; use only secure mobile end devices with separate storages for personal data and exchanged data with mobile services







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To my Conclusions ...



- 7. Efficient Protection against Intelligence Services does not exist (yet) !
- 8. Using a strong Security Testing Process regulated by Law will lead to a decrease in software vulnerabilities (if possible: open-source software and establishment of consistent standards)
- 9. Product Liability Laws for IT Manufacturers regarding data protection and security lacks must be passed (compare with automotive industry)!
- 10. German IT Security Legislation (Draft within the Federal Cabinet): establishing security standards and reporting obligations for cyberattacks in critical infrastructures
not clear: What happens afterwards ?

In Short: Development of Secure Software (if feasible), use of secure mobile end devices, Incentives for Open Standards, Product Liability Laws, Reward the detection of Security Vulnerabilities to avoid zero-day-attacks !!!

Thank you ...



Source: Fuldaer Zeitung, 05.07.2014

There is still a lot to be done ...



Any questions ?

u.buehler@informatik.hs-fulda.de